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        1 - A Comparative Study of Ibn Sina and Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi on God’s Knowledge
        Einollah  Khademi Mahmood  Ahesteh
        God’s Knowledge is one of the important philosophical problems whose various dimensions have continually been explored by different thinkers. In order to avoid the problem of change in divine essence, Ibn Sina argues that God’s Knowledge of particulars is possible throu More
        God’s Knowledge is one of the important philosophical problems whose various dimensions have continually been explored by different thinkers. In order to avoid the problem of change in divine essence, Ibn Sina argues that God’s Knowledge of particulars is possible through the knowledge of universals and causes. He also holds that the divine undifferentiated knowledge of existents is possible through imprinted forms. On the other hand, Muhaqqiq Tusi considers the necessary knowledge to belong to the category of relation and maintains that, in the Necessary Being’s Knowledge of changing particular affairs, some changes occur in the relation while the essence remains the same. Therefore, unlike Ibn Sina, Tusi accepts God’s Knowledge of particulars. He also criticizes Ibn Sina’s theory of the imprinting of established forms in the essence of the Necessary Being. Ibn Sina argues that the knowledge of divine essence through His Essence and the essential knowledge of imprinted forms, which is the cause of the appearance of existence, are of the presential type, while the differentiated knowledge of other existents is of the acquired type. In this paper, the writers explain and explore the philosophical principles of these two thinkers. Manuscript profile
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        2 - Qadi Kamal al-Din Hossein Ibn Mo‘in al-Din Meybodi: Life, Character, Views
        Alireza   Javanmardi Adib Maghsoud  Mohammadi
        Hossein Ibn Mo‘in al-Din Meybodi, nicknamed Kamal al-Din, known as Qadi, with Mantiqi as his pen-name, is one of the great figures and distinguished scientific, literary, and philosophical characters of the land of Iran. He was born in Meybod in Yazd Province in the nin More
        Hossein Ibn Mo‘in al-Din Meybodi, nicknamed Kamal al-Din, known as Qadi, with Mantiqi as his pen-name, is one of the great figures and distinguished scientific, literary, and philosophical characters of the land of Iran. He was born in Meybod in Yazd Province in the ninth century (AH). After learning the common preliminary intellectual and transmitted sciences of his time, he went to Shiraz in his youth and became a student of Dawani. Meybodi is a Muslim philosopher, an advocate of Shafi‘i school of thought, and a man of Tawalla (loving the People of the Prophet’s House). His love of the Commander of the Faithful (a) and the Pure and Infallible Household is so profound that some have considered him to be a Shi‘ite scholar. During the reign of Sultan Y‘aqub Aq Qoyunlu, he was a judge and the custodian of endowments of Yazd and its suburbs. His most important works include Sharh-i hidayah al-hikmah, Sharh-i diwan mansub bi Amir al-mu’minin (a), and Munsha’at. During the reign of Shah Isma‘il Safavi, when Mohammad Karra (ruler of Abarqu) captured the city of Yazd, Meybodi became his minister and, between 909 and 911 AH, when Shah Isma‘il recaptured Yazd, he was murdered on the King’s order. Meybodi believed that Illuminationists and Sufis (gnostics) were superior to theologians and Peripatetics and considered Peripatetic philosophy, which is based on rational deduction and reasoning, an immensely uncertain and ambiguous school which exhausts the intellect in the process of perceiving its fundamental principles. Unlike Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi, and Ibn Arabi, he was not the founder of a specific school of philosophy. However, given his accurate criticisms, investigations, and particular views regarding topics which interested theologians, Peripatetics, gnostics, and Illuminationists in the mould of a number of independent and dependent (commentaries and glosses) works, as a connecting link, he managed not only to play a significant role in developing Islamic philosophy and bringing the different philosophical trends and schools of his time together, but also become a source of inspiration for Mulla Sadra in developing the Transcendent Philosophy. Manuscript profile
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        3 - Historical Development of the Concept of Hyle (Matter) in the Works of Muslim Thinkers
        Mahmoud  Hedayatafza Mohammad Javad   Rezaeirah
        As generally acknowledged, the term “hyle” in Peripatetic philosophy has been derived from Aristotle’s views on matter and form or potency and act. Although this term has been defined as “matter lacking actuality and enjoying pure potency” in Islamic philosophy, a study More
        As generally acknowledged, the term “hyle” in Peripatetic philosophy has been derived from Aristotle’s views on matter and form or potency and act. Although this term has been defined as “matter lacking actuality and enjoying pure potency” in Islamic philosophy, a study of the works of Muslim thinkers reveals that, because of the integration of some philosophical views with gnostic ideas as well as the influence of Islamic teachings, this term has undergone different semantic changes. As a result, in some schools of philosophy, it has been consciously employed to refer to actual affairs. Below, the writers have provided eight meanings for “hyle”, which are listed in their chronological order of formulation: 1. Matter lacking any kind of actuality and enjoying pure potency, as accepted by Peripatetic philosophers and equivalent to its Aristotelian concept. 2. The fourth level of being, for the Isma‘ilite, which is posterior to the soul and prior to nature. 3. Pure substantial continuity, in some of Suhrawardi’s works, which, along with accidental quantity, constitutes the truth of body. 4. Matter inclusive of all possible worlds and an otherworldly expression of simple existence in the view of some gnostics. 5. One of the modes of form in line with Mulla Sadra’s view of the unitary integration of matter and form. 6. An equivalent to possible existence or created thing’s divine aspect (Face of God) in the view of Shaykh Ihsa’ei. 7. An expansion of the Aristotelian concept of prime hyle under the title of the dark nature of essence in Tafkik (separation) School. 8. An application of the matter of world to the element of water based on the religious texts of Tafkik School of thought. Manuscript profile
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        4 - A Critique of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī’s Criticism of Ibn Sīnā’s View of the Truth of Knowledge
        SeyedehZahra Mousavi Baygi Vahid Khademzadeh
        Although Muslim Philosophers have not specifically discussed epistemological problems, they have extensively spoken of some general issues regarding knowledge. Ibn Sīnā has provided various definitions and explanations in relation to the nature of knowledge on different More
        Although Muslim Philosophers have not specifically discussed epistemological problems, they have extensively spoken of some general issues regarding knowledge. Ibn Sīnā has provided various definitions and explanations in relation to the nature of knowledge on different occasions in many of his works. He has conceived of knowledge sometimes as pure quality, sometimes as quality possessing relation, and sometimes as pure relation. Moreover, he has interpreted knowledge as abstraction from matter in some of his works. Such a diversity of interpretations has given an excuse to some people such as Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī to criticize and question Ibn Sīnā’s view of the truth of knowledge. In different places in his works, Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī emphasizes that Ibn Sīnā’s view of knowledge was divided, and he failed to attain a single standpoint concerning the truth of knowledge. The present study, which was conducted following an analytic-descriptive method and a critical approach, firstly presents Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī’s claim and, then, evaluates its truth. Next, the authors delve into his other works to examine the definitions of knowledge in his view. The findings of this study demonstrate that, although there are some fundamental problems in Ibn Sīnā’s view, his words are based on his own principles, are solid, and can be reduced to a unitary view. However, Rāzī’s words on this problem are inconsistent. Manuscript profile
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        5 - From Imaginal Faculty to Imagination: A Review of the Evolution of the Concept of Imagination in the Philosophical Systems of Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī, and Mullā Ṣadrā
        Ibrahim Bazargani
        Imagination is one of the human perceptive faculties that is shared with animals. This concept, which has been transferred from Greek philosophy to Muslims’ philosophical tradition, has always been a very important problem with various functions in the self-knowledge of More
        Imagination is one of the human perceptive faculties that is shared with animals. This concept, which has been transferred from Greek philosophy to Muslims’ philosophical tradition, has always been a very important problem with various functions in the self-knowledge of Muslim philosophers from Fārābī to Mullā Ṣadrā. It has even been used in responding to some kalāmī inquiries. Since the very beginning, Muslim philosophers have continuously devoted some of their studies to the investigation and explanation of the whatness and howness of the concept of imagination. However, this concept has not remained immune against change and has developed a distinct meaning in each philosophical system. In the history of Islamic philosophy, the three-fold schools of philosophy (Peripatetic philosophy, Illuminationist philosophy, and the Transcendent Philosophy) have each adopted a particular and different approach to this problem. The present study intends to examine the theories of some great figures of Islamic philosophy regarding the whatness of the faculty of imagination and reveal the existing differences among them. The findings indicate that philosophers’ views of the concept of imagination have not been fixed and similar in the course of history, and each has presented a specific and innovative explanation of this concept in conformity with their own philosophical system. For example, Fārābī considered this faculty to be a material component of the soul, while Mullā Ṣadrā changed it into the world of Ideas. This study was conducted following a descriptive-comparative method using library resources. Manuscript profile
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        6 - Aristotelean Roots of the Soul’s Corporeal Origination in Mullā Ṣadrā’s View
        Hamideh  Ansari Hassan Fathi Morteza  Shajari
        Philosophers have presented different views about the whatness and truth of the soul based on dualism (immateriality of the soul based on the pre-eternity and origination of the soul before the existence of the body or along with it) or monism (corporeal origination of More
        Philosophers have presented different views about the whatness and truth of the soul based on dualism (immateriality of the soul based on the pre-eternity and origination of the soul before the existence of the body or along with it) or monism (corporeal origination of the soul). Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the soul is corporeally originated. The principles of the Transcendent Philosophy, including the trans-substantial motion, the principiality and gradedness of being, and the corporeal origination of the soul, have made it possible to demonstrate corporeal resurrection. Aristotle also believes that the origination of the soul is corporeal. However, the extent to which Mullā Ṣadrā is influenced by Aristotle’s ideas in this regard has never been studied so far. This paper is intended to explain the Aristotelean roots of Mullā Ṣadrā’s discussion of corporeal origination following a comparative-analytic method. The findings of this study indicate that in defining the soul as a “natural and organic body” and, following it, considering the soul as a formal substance and a primary perfection of the body, as well as believing in the unitary synthesis of the body and the soul and the unity of the faculties of the soul, all indicating the corporeal origination of the soul, Mullā Ṣadrā is under the influence of Aristotle. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s approach suffers from some ambiguity because of the existing implicitness in some of his words and not referring to an explicit standpoint regarding the principiality of existence or quiddity, presence of motion in substance, and gradedness of existence. Manuscript profile